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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of global financial crisis focusing on State Owned Commercial Banks (SCBs)
and Private Commercial Banks (PCBs) ownership and others bank specific and macroeconomics factors
influencing profit efficiency level of the Bangladesh banking sector. The Slack-Based Data Envelopment
Analysis (SBM-DEA) method employed to compute the profit efficiency of 31 commercial banks operating in
the Bangladesh over the years 2004–2011. Furthermore, the multivariate panel regression analysis framework
based on the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Generalized Least Square (GLS) methods comprising the
Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) models adopted to examine the determinants of banks profit
efficiency. Results indicate the levels of profit efficiency on SCBs and PCBs are increasing by 3.7% and
5.8% during financial crisis years. However, over the period of post financial crisis years exhibited, profit
efficiency levels on SCBs and PCBs are decreasing by 38.7% and 9.9%. Although profit efficiency levels
on both ownership of banks show declining over the post financial crisis years, the PCBs still higher than
SCBs (67.8% > 60.1%) but insignificantly different. Furthermore, the findings reveals that the relationship
of size of bank, liquidity, economic growth and market concentration are significantly negative with profit
efficiency of SCBs but positive to PCBs. Meanwhile, the factors of capitalization, credit risk and inflation
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are significant with the positive and negative sign only to the profit efficiency of the SCBs over the period
of post global financial crisis.
All Rights Reserved © 2016 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Contaduría y Admin-
istración. This is an open access item distributed under the Creative Commons CC License BY-NC-ND
4.0.
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Resumen
Este estudio investiga el impacto de la crisis financiera global enfocándose en la propiedad de los bancos
comerciales del Estado (SCB) y privados (PCB) y otros factores específicos de la banca y macroeconómi-
cos que influyen en el nivel de eficiencia de las ganancias del sector bancario de Bangladesh. Se empleó
el método de análisis envolvente de datos basado en el déficit (Slack-Based  Data  Envelopment  Analysis
[SBM-DEA]) para calcular la eficiencia en las ganancias de los 31 bancos comerciales que operaron en
Bangladesh en los an˜os 2004 a 2011. Por otra parte, el marco de análisis de regresión multivariante del panel
basado en los métodos de mínimos cuadrados ordinarios (MCO) y de mínimos cuadrados generalizados
(MCG) que comprenden los modelos de efecto fijo (EF) y de efecto aleatorio (EA) se adoptó para examinar
los determinantes de la eficiencia de las ganancias de los bancos. Los resultados indican que los niveles de
eficiencia de las ganancias en los SCB y los PCB son crecientes en un 3.7 y un 5.8% durante los an˜os de crisis
financiera. Sin embargo, durante el período de an˜os posteriores a la crisis financiera exhibida, los niveles de
eficiencia en beneficios en los SCB y los PCB son decrecientes en un 38.7 y un 9.9%. Aunque los niveles
de eficiencia en las ganancias de los bancos de ambos tipos de propiedad muestran disminución a lo largo de
los an˜os posteriores a la crisis financiera, en los PCB son más altos que en los SCB (67,8% > 60,1%), pero
no significativamente distintos. Además, los resultados revelan que las relaciones del taman˜o del banco, la
liquidez, el crecimiento económico y la concentración del mercado son significativamente negativas con
la eficiencia en las ganancias de los SCB pero positivas para los PCB. Mientras tanto, los factores de capi-
talización, el riesgo de crédito y la inflación son significativos con el signo positivo y negativo solo para la
eficiencia de las ganancias de los SCB durante el período de la post-crisis financiera global.
Derechos Reservados © 2016 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Contaduría y Admin-
istración. Este es un artículo de acceso abierto distribuido bajo los términos de la Licencia Creative Commons
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
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Introduction
The banking sector is the main source of funds for long-term investments and the foundation of
economic growth (Schumpeter, 1934). In most developing countries, the banking sector represents
the backbone of the financial system. Therefore, an efficient and profitable banking sector may
help ensure an effective financial system which is conducive to economic growth and development.
Levine (1998) points out that the efficiency of financial intermediation affects a country’s economic
growth and at the same time, bank (financial intermediation) insolvencies could result in systemic
crises and consequently negative implications on the economy.
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The banking sector is considered the backbone of most economies and plays a important
role in attaining economic growth and development and becomes the most important mecha-
nisms of Bangladesh financial system since the early 1970s. During the early years, all financial
institutions, including commercial banks, are required to fulfil economic objectives set by the gov-
ernment. However, the efficiency of the banking sector has become an imperative issue among
policymakers in Bangladesh since the formation of the National Commission on Money, Bank-
ing and Credit in 1986 (Shameem, 1995). The purpose for the establishment of the commission
among others is to find solutions for efficient operations and management of the banking system
(Shameem, 1995). In maintaining the stability of the banking system, the efficiency of the banking
sector is important so as to ensure that banks remain profitable and healthy.
It would be reasonable to expect that improvements in profit efficiency could lead to higher
bank profitability levels and help ensure the sustainability of the country’s economic growth.
Besides, profit efficiency is also in line with firms’ main objective that is to maximize profit
since it takes into account both the cost and revenue effects on changes in outputs scale and
scope. Profit efficiency measures how close a bank is in producing the maximum level of profit,
given the amount of inputs and outputs and their price levels (Ariff & Can, 2008). Thus, profit
efficiency provides a complete description on the economic goal of a bank which requires that
banks reduce their costs and increase their revenues. Furthermore, Berger and Mester (2003)
among others suggest that profit efficiency offers valuable information on the efficiency of bank
managements.
Nevertheless, during the years 2007–2008 financial crisis has resulted in bank foreclo-
sures in both the developed and developing economies. Throughout the period, approximately
168 United States (U.S.) banks have failed, while the profitability and the efficiency lev-
els of banking sectors worldwide declined abruptly. The financial crisis illustrated how
ruinous problems in the financial sector could be for the entire economy. In the case of
Bangladesh country, the impact of this global financial crisis is slightly different to other
affected countries mostly from European and U.S. Although the global financial crisis has
not been directly felt because of the shielding of the economy from the most immediate
effects of the crisis, the economy of Bangladesh could be poorly effected due to the insta-
bility of the financial market and economic conditions in the developed and several emerging
economies.
In fact, even though it is hard to speculate how bad the financial crisis would affect the devel-
oping countries, the failing financial institutions and toxic assets in US and others developed
countries can indirectly provide the lower level of profit efficiency to the developing countries’
banks. Thus, the developing country like Bangladesh could use the phenomena of financial crisis
that affect the developed countries as a guidance to provide the wise strategies in constructing
their financial systems to remain the higher level of bank profit efficiency. Furthermore, numer-
ous developed and developing countries experienced some important ownership transformations
in several dimension during the years 2007 to 2013 due to the impact of global financial crisis
(Claessens & Horen, 2014). This phenomena leads several banks retrenched from foreign activ-
ities, others grasped opportunities to expand abroad or increase their market shares in foreign
countries to ensure the.
In fact, the factor of ownership can also significantly influence the efficiency of the banks.
According to Isik and Hassan (2003) the banking sectors have heterogeneous ownership, cor-
porate, market and risk characteristics. The selection of the ownership such as local, foreign,
private, public, state, etc. is vital in the context of non-bank firms and banking sector (Boubakri,
Cosset, Fischer, & Guedhami, 2005). Besides, the ownership represent an essential element for
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the development of health banking sector in developing countries. Generally, the ownership of
Bangladesh banks can be categorized into four groups namely Nationalized Commercial Banks or
State Owned Commercial Banks (SCBs), Private Commercial Banks (PCBs), Specialized Devel-
opment Banks (SDBs), and Foreign Commercial Banks (FCBs). The SCBs (consists of four banks
which are Agrani Bank, Janata Bank, Rupali Bank Limited and Sonali banks) were formed via the
event of merger process of all commercial banks operating in Bangladesh except foreign banks.
SCBs were considered as the proper means of generating savings that can be facilitate industrial
finance to the sectors of the economy with the greatest development prospects (Islam, Siddiqui,
Hossain, & Karim, 2014).
The PCBs lead the Bangladesh banking sector since they cover more than 50% of total assets
and deposits. Basically, the PCBs’ performance is higher than SCBs and SDBs because their
quality and superb services such as banking service automation and client service innovation.
Islam et al. (2014) reported that the PCBs have rapidly occupy the market share at the expense of
the SCBs. In present, the PCBs have more than 59% of total deposits but SCBs have only 28%
and PCBs assets coverage is 58% while it is only 29% in SCBs. Meanwhile, the SDBs and FCBs
are not similar to both SCBs and PCBs commercial banks ownership. SDBs are formed specifi-
cally to promote agricultural development and to promote small and medium entrepreneurship in
Bangladesh, whilst FCBs are the banks that operating in the Bangladesh which was incorporated in
abroad.
Therefore, this study investigate for the first time empirical evidence on impact of global finan-
cial crisis focusing on SCBs and PCBs ownership and others bank specific and macroeconomics
factors influencing profit efficiency level of the Bangladesh banking sector. Although studies on
bank efficiency are voluminous, these studies have mainly concentrated on the banking sectors
of the western and developed countries (Berger, 2007). Besides, very few have been examine
issues of global financial crisis specifically on SCBs and PCBs ownership on the specific profit
efficiency in the Bangladesh banks. On the other hand, empirical evidence on the developing
countries is relatively scarce and the majority of these studies focuses on the technical, pure tech-
nical, and scale efficiency concepts. To do so, we adopt a two stage analysis. In the first stage,
we employ the Slack-Based Data Envelopment Analysis (SBM-DEA) method to compute the
profit efficiency of 31 commercial banks operating in the Bangladesh banking sector during the
period 2004–2011 which encapsulates the most recent global financial crisis period and covered
the types of bank ownership. In the second stage, we employ a multivariate panel regression
analysis framework based on the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Generalized Least Square
(GLS) methods comprising the Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) models to examine
the potential determinants of banks’ profit efficiency.
The paper is set out as follows: the next section provides review of the related literature and
hypotheses development, followed by “Data and methodology employed” section which outlines
the data and methodology employed by the study. “Empirical results” section reports the empirical
findings. Finally, we conclude in “Conclusions” section with some discussions on the policy issues
and offers avenues for future research.
Theoretical  framework  and  literature  review
Cobb  Douglas  production  theory
The basic concept of efficiency is that it measures how well firms transform their inputs into
outputs according to their behavioural objectives (Fare, Grosskopf, Norris, & Zhang, 1994).
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A firm is said to be efficient if it is able to achieve its goals and inefficient if it fails. In
normal circumstances, a firm’s goal is assumed to be cost minimization of production. Thus,
any waste of inputs is to be avoided so that there is no idleness in the use of resources. In
the production theory, it is often assumed that firms are behaving efficiently in an economic sense.
The production theory originally proposed by Cobb and Douglas (1928) namely Cobb Douglass
Production Theory assumes that firms behave efficiently in an economic sense. He develops
the production theory from the movement of labour, capital, production, value and wages for
the manufacturing industries. According to Fare, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1985), firms are able to
successfully allocate all resources in an efficient manner relative to the constraints imposed by the
structure of the production technology, by the structure of input and output markets, and relative
to whatever behavioural goals attributed to the producers.
Furthermore, Berger and Humphrey (1997) extend the production function model to the bank-
ing sector by focusing mainly on financial sector’s efficiency. The efficiency of the financial sector
underlines the efficient allocations of financial resources that are required to promote productivity.
This indicates that the economy has the opportunity to transfer the input of saving resources for
more productive output such as investments.
Technical  and  cost  efﬁciency
A wide range of models have been used to investigate a spectrum of efficiency related issues
in a wide range of environments. Koopmans (1951) was the first to provide the definition of
technical efficiency where the producer is technically efficient if an increase in any output requires
a reduction in at least one output and if a reduction in any input requires an increase in at
least one other input or a reduction in at least an output. Liebstein (1966) on the other hand
was the first to introduce the concept of X-efficiency. The X-efficiency concept defines cost
inefficiencies that are due to wasteful use of inputs, or managerial weakness. The X-efficiency
concept seeks to explain why all firms do not succeed in minimizing the cost of production
and recognizes that the sources of X-efficiency may also be from outside of the firm. In this
regard, Button and Weyman-Jones (1992) suggest that X-inefficiency is due partly to the firm’s
own actions as well as from exogenous factors surrounding the environment in which the firm
operates.
Ariff and Can (2008) state that, the cost efficiency means that a firm is able to minimize the
costs of inputs while producing the same amount of outputs sold at certain. Berger and Humphrey
(1997) claimed that most of the previous studies focused on the cost efficiency and suggested that
research on the profit efficiency has been scarce. Most ignored the revenue and profit side on the
efficiency of the banks since only nine out of 130 studies on efficiency of financial institutions
reviewed, had analyzed profit efficiency (Bader, Mohammed, Ariff, and Hassan, 2008). Basically,
profit maximization requires a firm to choose an input and output bundle such that the output
bundle generates the maximum revenue possible from the corresponding input bundle. At the
same time, the input bundle chosen produces the corresponding output bundle at the lowest
cost.
However, a study by Adongo, Strok, and Hasheela (2005) suggested that cost efficiency may not
sufficient to describe the overall performance of the bank’s financial performance. The reason is
that cost efficiency only considers on how to minimize the cost, but it does not take into account the
revenue gained from the provision of higher quality services. Also, cost efficiency only evaluates
the performance holding output quantities statistically fixed at their observed levels, but it does
not consider the optimally efficient levels involving a different scale and mix of outputs. Thus,
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the bank is considered cost efficient at the current output which may or may not be cost efficient
at optimal outputs. In this regard, the problem could be solved by examining the profit efficiency
concept.
Proﬁt  efﬁciency
Profit efficiency refers to a firm’s maximization of profit and involves both the cost and revenue
effects on the changes in output scale and scope. Profit efficiency considers how successful a bank
is in achieving maximum profit based on a given level of inputs and outputs and a level of their
prices (Ariff & Can, 2008). Therefore, the profit efficiency of a bank describes how it is able
to reduce cost and increase revenue. According to Berger and Mester (2003), profit efficiency
provides more useful information on management efficiency. Also, Adongo et al. (2005) maintain
that there is profit efficiency if cost increase is due to increased or enhanced output but increase
in revenue should exceed increase in cost.
Jayaraman and Srinivasan (2014) examine the profit efficiency of banks in India. They
employed the Nerlovian profit indicator to measure the banks profit efficiency. The profit ineffi-
ciency of banks has been decomposed into technical and allocation inefficiency using directional
distance function. The study suggest that banks profit inefficiency is due to inefficiency from
the element of allocative and this indicates banks required to focus on optimal utilization of
input–output mix.
Another study by Fu, Juo, Chiang, Yu, and Huang (2015) investigate the profit efficiencies
of 70 Chinese and 34 Taiwanese banks in 2011. They include the equity capital as a quasi-fixed
input and develop the risk-based measure of the meta Nerlovian profit efficiency to consider risk
consideration of banks. The profit efficiency involve the basic two elements which are technology
and allocative efficiencies. The empirical results summarized that the Chinese joint-equity banks,
Chinese state-owned banks and Taiwanese state-owned banks perform the best in meta profit
efficiency.
In the Malaysian Islamic and conventional banks cases, Kamarudin and Yahya (2013) study
the cost, revenue and profit efficiency on both banks ownership. This research employed Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method on the sample of 39 Islamic and conventional banks.
They discovered that the levels of profit and cost efficiency for Islamic banks are lower than
conventional banks due to the factors of bank-specifics characteristics and macroeconomic
conditions.
Kamarudin, Nordin, Muhammad, and Hamid (2014) examine the efficiency level on Islamic
and conventional banks in Gulf Cooperation Council countries on the 74 banks over the years
2007–2011. The findings seems to suggest that lower Islamic banks profit efficiency level due to
the higher level on banks revenue inefficiency. Another study by Sufian and Kamarudin (2015)
also find the similar finding where the Islamic banks revenue efficiency has greater influence on the
profit efficiency levels in the selected Southeast Asian countries consists of Malaysia, Indonesia
and Brunei over the years 2006–2011. The results show that the level of profit efficiency in the
domestic Islamic banks is higher than foreign Islamic banks due to the higher level of revenue
efficiency on domestic Islamic banks. They suggest that the higher profit efficiency levels the
higher profitability of the banks.
In general, most of the previous studies applied the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to
measure banks profit efficiency and its required the selection of inputs, input prices, outputs and
output prices. The collection or selection of the bank inputs and outputs could be difficult in
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the evaluation of the bank efficiency to be used in the first stage of DEA analysis. Bader et al.
(2008) stated explicitly that there is ‘no perfect approach’ in the selection of the bank inputs and
outputs. Berger and Humphrey (1997) also found that there are some restrictions on the type of
variables since there is a need for comparable data and to minimize possible biases due to different
accounting practices in the collection of the variables. In fact, they stated that even in the same
country, different banks might apply different accounting standards. The results of the efficiency
scores for each study on the bank efficiency will be affected due to the selection of variables.
Thus, the DEA method requires bank inputs, input prices, outputs and output prices as the choice
is always an arbitrary issue (Ariff & Can, 2008; Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Sufian, Kamarudin,
& Noor, 2013).
The above literature reveals the following research gaps. First, the majority of these stud-
ies have mainly concentrated on other countries rather than Bangladesh. Second, empirical
evidence generally focus on the technical, cost, revenue and profit efficiencies in the banking
sectors without indentifying the impact of specific potential and macroeconomics determi-
nants on banks profit efficiency. Finally, virtually nothing has been published on the specific
impact of global financial crisis and ownership to the specific profit efficiency concept in the
Bangladesh banks. In the light of these knowledge gaps, this paper seeks to provide new
empirical evidence on the impact of global financial crisis to the profit efficiency and others
factors that influence the level of profit efficiency of the SCBs and PCBs in Bangladesh baking
sector.
Data  and  methodology  employed
The present study gathers data on commercial banks operating in the Bangladesh banking
sector during the years 2004 to 2011. The source of financial data is the Bureau van Dijk’s
BankScope database which provides banks’ balance sheet and income statement information.
Due to the entry and exit of banks during the years, the actual number of banks operating in
the Bangladesh banking sector varies. The final sample comprised of 31 commercial banks of
which complete data are available for the years 2004–2011. The analysis periods are divided
into three event windows: 2004–2006, referred as pre global financial crisis, 2007–2008, referred
as during global financial crisis, and 2009–2011, considered as post-merger period. This event
window was inspired by Rhoades (1998) who suggested that the three-year time period is optimal
because about half of any efficiency gains should be realized within three years (−3,3). This fact
is almost unanimously agreed among the experts interviewed. In order to maintain homogeneity,
only state owned commercial banks (SCBs) and private commercial banks (PCBs) are included
in the analysis. Foreign commercial banks (FCBs) and specialized development banks (SDBs)
are excluded from the sample.
Data  envelopment  analysis  (DEA)
The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method is based on mathematical programming model
developed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) known as Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes
Model (CCR) that has been adopted by several studies to measures banks’ efficiency (e.g.
Kamarudin, Nordin, & Nasir, 2013; Kamarudin, Nasir, Yahya, Said, & Nordin, 2014; Sufian,
Muhammad, Nordin, Yahya, & Kamarudin, 2013; Sufian, Kamarudin, & Noor, 2014). The method
seeks to establish how the n  decision making units (banks in our case) determine the envelopment
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surface (the best practice efficiency frontier). The CCR model presupposes that there is no sig-
nificant relationship between the scale of operations and efficiency by assuming constant returns
to scale (CRS) and is only justifiable when all decision making units are operating at an opti-
mal scale. However, technological advances and regulatory changes may have different impacts
across banks of different sizes resulting in banks to face either economies or diseconomies of
scale (Assaf, Barros, & Matousek, 2011). To address this issue, Banker, Charnes, and Cooper
(1984) extends the CCR model by relaxing the CRS assumption. The resulting Banker, Charnes
and Cooper (BCC) Model is used to assess the efficiency of decision making units characterized
by variable returns to scale (VRS). Thus, the primary profit efficiency VRS model is given in Eq.
(1):
max
s∑
r=1
qor y˜ro −
m∑
i=1
poi x˜io
subject to
n∑
j=1
λjxij ≤  x˜io i =  1,  2,  .  . ., m;
n∑
j=1
λjyrj ≥  y˜ro r  =  1,  2,  .  .  ., s;
x˜io ≤  xio,  y˜ro ≥  yro
λj ≥  0
n∑
j=1
λj=1
(1)
where s  is a is output observation, m  is a input observation, r  is a sth output, i  is a mth input, qor
is unit price of the output r  of decision making unitso (DMUo), poi is a unit price of the input i  of
DMUo, y˜io is a rth output that maximize revenue for DMUo, x˜io is a ith input that minimize cost
for DMUo, yro is a rth output for DMUo, xio is a ith input for DMUo, n is a DMU observation, j
is a nth DMU, λj is a non-negative scalars, yrj is a sth output for nth DMU, xij is a mth input for
nth DMU.
The  slack-based  data  envelopment  analysis  (SBM-DEA)
The present study employs the non-parametric Slack-Based Data Envelopment Analysis
(SBM-DEA) method to compute the efficiency of individual banks operating in the Bangladesh
banking sector (e.g. Sufian & Kamarudin, 2014). The method constructs the frontier of the
observed input-output ratios by linear programming techniques. The method is a non-radial
efficiency measure dealing directly with input excesses and output shortfalls (Tone, 2002).
A decision making units (DMU) that refer to bank is said to be efficient with a value of
unity if the DMU is on the frontier of the production possibility set with no input and output
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slack. The estimated model is modified from Eq. (1) and the profit efficiency can be illustrated
by
θ∗  =  max θ
max
n∑
i=1
s−i +
s∑
r=1
s+r
subject to
n∑
j=1
λjxij +  s−i =  xio i =  1,  2,  . .  ., m;
n∑
j=1
λjyrj −  s+r =  yro r  =  1,  2,  .  .  ., s;
λj,  s
−
i ,  s
+
r ≥  0
(2)
where DMU0 is one of the n  DMUs under evaluation; xio and yro are the ith input and rth out-
put for DMU0, respectively; and λj represents the unknown weights, where j  represents the
number of DMUs. The optimal value of θ* represents the distance from the efficient fron-
tier. Therefore, the most efficient bank will have θ* = 1 and the inefficient bank will exhibit
θ* <  1.
The SBM-DEA method is preferred to parametric estimation as the former deals with input
excesses and output shortfalls simultaneously rather than holding the input or output at a given
level (Chan, Karim, Burton, & Aktan, 2014). Furthermore, Chiu and Chen (2009) suggest that the
SBM-DEA method provides a well representation of banking operation in the real situation since
banks are given a certain degree of control on both the input and output sides. For the purpose of
this study, we adopt the SBM-DEA under the VRS model to solve the profit efficiency problem.
Eq. (2) is modified to a VRS slack-based model as follows:
max
n∑
i=1
w−i s
−
i +
s∑
r=1
w+r s
+
r
subject to
n∑
j=1
λjxij +  s−i =  xio i =  1,  2,  . .  ., m;
n∑
j=1
λjyrj −  s+r =  yro r  =  1,  2,  .  .  ., s;
λj,  s
−
i ,  s
+
r ≥  0
n∑
j=1
λj =  1
(3)
where w−i and w+r are user-specified weights obtained through value judgement. While, s−i is
the ith input slack and s+r is the rth output slack. The SBM-DEA method under the VRS model
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assumes that production takes place with a disproportionate change in inputs and outputs. The
scalar, ρ, which captures the VRS based slack variables, is as follows:
ρ  =
(
1
a
m∑
m=1
xoj,m −  s−j,m
xoj,m
)(
1
b
n∑
n=1
yoj,n −  s+j,n
yoj,n
)
(4)
Approach  selection,  input  and  output  variables
There are three main approaches that are widely used in the banking theory literature namely,
production, intermediation, and value added approaches (Sealey & Lindley, 1977). The present
study adopts the intermediation approach attributed to three main reasons. First, the study attempts
to evaluate the efficiency of the whole banking sector and not branches of a particular bank. Second,
the intermediation approach is the most preferred approach among researchers investigating the
efficiency of banking sectors in developing countries (e.g. Bader et al., 2008; Isik & Hassan, 2002).
Third, Sealey and Lindley (1977) suggest that financial institutions normally employ labour,
physical capital, and deposits as their inputs to produce earning assets. Since the issue selecting
approaches is still arbitrary (Ariff & Can, 2008; Berger & Humphrey, 1997; Sufian & Habibullah,
2009a; Sufian, Kamarudin, & Noor, 2013), this study had decided to use intermediation approach
because we assume bank is more suitable to be classified as intermediary entity. Table 3 provides
a listing of inputs and outputs chosen for a few of these studies. The choice of the inputs, outputs,
input prices and output prices are guided by the choices made in previous studies summarized in
Table 1a.
For the purpose of this study, three inputs and two outputs variables are chosen. The selection
of the input and output variables are based on Ariff and Can (2008) and other major studies on the
efficiency of banking sectors in developing countries (e.g. Bader et al., 2008; Sufian, Kamarudin,
& Noor, 2012; Sufian, Kamarudin, & Noor, 2013). The three input vector variables consist of x1:
Deposits, x2: Labour, and x3: Capital. Meanwhile, the two output vector variables are y1: Loans
and y2: Investments. The input prices consist of w1: Price of Deposit, w2: Price of Labour and w3:
Price of Capital. The two output prices consist of r1: Price of Loans and r2: Price of Investment.
The summary of data used to construct the efficiency frontiers are presented in Table 1b.
Multivariate  panel  regression  analysis
To examine the relationship between the profit efficiency of Bangladesh banks and the con-
textual variables, we use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Generalized Least Square (GLS)
methods comprising the Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE) models to examine the poten-
tial determinants of banks’ profit efficiency (Table 2). We estimate a linear regression model in
the following form
yit =  αt +  βjt(INTERjt +  EXTERjt) +  εjt (5)
where j refers to an individual bank; t  refers to year; y  refers to the profit efficiency and is the
observation of bank j in a particular year t; INTER  represents the internal (bank specific) factors;
EXTER represents the external (macroeconomic and market conditions) factors; εjt is a normally
distributed random variable disturbance term. By extending Eq. (5) to reflect the internal (bank
specific) and external (macroeconomic and market) variables discussed in “Theoretical framework
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Table 1a
Summary of inputs and outputs on bank efficiency analysis.
Study Inputs (x) Outputs (y) Input prices Output prices
Sufian, Kamarudin,
and Noor (2013)
1. Deposits
2: Labour
1. Loans
2. Investment
1. Price of deposits (total
interest expenses/deposits)
2. Price of labour (personnel
expenses/total assets)
1. price of loans (interest
income on loans
and others interest
income/loans)
2. price of
investment(other
operating income/income)
Sufian et al. (2012) 1. Deposit
2. Labour
3. Physical capital
1. Loans
2. Investment
3. Off-balance
sheet item
1. Price of deposit(total
interest expenses/deposits)
2. Price of labour(personnel
expenses/total assets)
3. Price of physical
capital(Other operating
expenses/fixed assets)
1. Price of loans(interest
income on loans
and others interest
income/loan)
2. Price of
investment(other
operating
income/investment)
3. Price of off-balance
sheet item(net fees and
commissions/off-balance
sheet items)
Ariff and Can
(2008)
1. Deposits
2. No. of
employees
3. Physical capital
1. Loans
2. Investment
(short and long
term)
1. Price of deposits (interest
paid/deposits)
2. Price of labour(personnel
expenses/no. of employees)
3. Price of physical capital
(other operating
expenses/physical capital)
1. Price of loans(interest
from loans/loans)
2. Price of
investment(investment
income/investment)
Bader et al. (2008) 1. Labour
2. Fixed assets
3. Total Funds
1. Total loans
2. Investment
3. Off-balance
sheet items
1. Price of labour(total
personnel expenses/total
funds)
2. Price of fixed
assets(depreciation
expenses/fixed assets)
3. Price of funds(interest
expenses on deposits and
non-deposits funds plus other
operating expenses/total
funds)
1. Price of loans(interest
income/total loans)
2. Price of invest-
ment(investment/other
earning assets)
3. Price of off balance
sheet items(net
commission revenue plus
net earning
income/off-balance sheet
items)
and literature review” section, we estimate the following regression model:
LN(PE)it =  α  +  βjt(LNTAjt +  LNLLRGLjt + LNNIITAjt +  LNETAjt
+  LNNIETAjt +  LNLOANSTAjt +  LNGDPt + LNINFLt
+  LNCR3t +  PTCtLNTAjt ∗  PTCt +  LNLLRGLjt ∗  PTCt
+  LNNIITAjt ∗ PTCt +  LNETAjt ∗  PTCt +  LNNIETAjt ∗  PTCt
+  LNLOANSTAjt ∗  PTCt +  LNGDPt ∗  PTCt +  LNINFLt ∗  PTCt
+  LNCR3t ∗  PTCt) +  εjt (6)
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Table 1b
Summary statistics of the input and output variables 2004–2011.
Variable Crisis period Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation
Deposit (x1)
Pre 4305.000 303,955.400 47,247.761 62,227.976
During 5691.000 364,931.900 67,553.580 73,925.609
Post 7545.700 535,288.400 108,993.191 94,721.342
Labour (x2)
Pre 51.100 3718.700 655.133 801.734
During 120.600 5822.300 1001.816 1148.399
Post 142.400 9345.600 1690.263 1655.307
Capital (x3)
Pre 17.300 3383.500 511.336 666.660
During 37.200 9920.900 1364.423 2126.094
Post 39.000 23,026.400 2892.831 3400.495
Loan (y1)
Pre 3073.000 274,486.300 38,290.293 51,509.073
During 5010.400 278,501.400 55,937.773 58,925.302
Post 6256.200 345,991.300 87,373.341 66,540.986
Investment (y2)
Pre 200.000 58,895.500 7079.030 10,910.332
During 508.400 95,344.100 11,488.195 18,888.809
Post 710.100 134,075.800 19,765.555 24,362.132
Price of deposit (w1)
Pre 0.032 0.093 0.062 0.015
During 0.033 0.111 0.070 0.019
Post 0.034 0.173 0.066 0.019
Price of labour (w2)
Pre 0.005 0.022 0.011 0.005
During 0.005 0.023 0.012 0.005
Post 0.005 0.023 0.013 0.004
Price of capital (w3)
Pre 0.229 18.975 1.656 2.646
During 0.180 12.857 1.318 1.870
Post 0.075 2.522 0.807 0.537
Price of loan (r1)
Pre 0.052 0.171 0.106 0.025
During 0.047 0.169 0.117 0.024
Post 0.095 0.247 0.128 0.022
Price of investment (r2)
Pre 0.032 0.810 0.231 0.130
During 0.000 0.628 0.119 0.110
Post 0.000 0.285 0.047 0.044
Notes: x1: deposits (deposits and short term funding), x2: labour (personnel expenses), x3: capital (fixed assets), y1: loans
(gross loan), y2: investment (total security)
Pre: pre global financial crisis (2004–2006), During: during global financial crisis (2007–2008), Post: post financial crisis
(2009–2011).
Source: Bankscope Database & authors’ own calculation.
Empirical  results
Before proceeding with the discussion of SBM-DEA results, this study first tested the rule
of thumb on the selection of inputs and outputs variables suggested by Cooper, Seiford, and
Tone (2002). Since the total number of DMUs (31 banks) in this study is more than the numbers
of inputs and outputs variables (3 inputs ×  2 outputs @ 3 [3 inputs + 2 outputs]), the selection of
variables are valid since it complies with the rule of thumb and allows the efficiencies of DMUs
to be measured. Next, by calculating the profit efficiency level on all pre, during and post global
financial crisis periods, we could observe the profit efficiency level of SCBs and PCBs ownership
to these periods and further obtain more robust results. Fig. 1 (graph) and Table 3 illustrates profit
efficiency level pre, during and post global financial crisis on SCBs and PCBs ownership.
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Fig. 1. Graph on profit efficiency level pre, during and post global financial crisis on SCBs and PCBs ownership.
Table 2
Variables used in the multivariate panel regression analysis.
Variable Description
Dependent
LN(PE) (Proﬁt Efﬁciency) Natural log of the profit efficiency derived
from the DEA method.
Independent
Bank speciﬁc factors
LNTA (Size) The natural log of the accounting value
of bank j’s total assets in year t.
LNLLRGL (Credit risk) Natural log of loan loss reserves/gross loans.
An indicator of credit risk, which shows how
much a bank is provisioning in year t relative
to its total loans.
LNNIITA (Diversiﬁcation) A measure of bank’s diversification towards
non-interest income, computed as the natural
log of non-interest income over total assets.
LNETA (Capitalization) A measure of bank’s capital strength in year
t, calculated as the natural log of equity/total
assets.
LNNIETA (Overhead expenses) Calculated as the natural log of non-interest
expense/total assets and provides
information on the efficiency of the
management regarding expenses relative
to assets in year t.
LNLOANSTA (Liquidity) A measure of bank’s loans intensity
calculated as the natural log of total loans
divided by total assets.
Macroeconomic conditions
LNGDP (Economic growth) The natural log of gross domestic products.
LNINFL (Inﬂation) The natural log of the rate of inflation.
LNCR3 (Market concentration) The natural log of the three largest banks
asset concentration ratio.
PTC (Dummy post global ﬁnancial crisis) A binary variable that takes a value of
1 for the post global financial crisis period, 0
otherwise.
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Proﬁt  efﬁciency  pre,  during  and  post  global  ﬁnancial  crisis:  SBCs  vs.  PCBs
Table 3 shows the means of profit efficiency for pre, during and post global financial crisis
periods of the SCBs and PCBs ownership. They are 95.1% vs. 71.9%, 98.8% vs. 77.7%, and
60.1% vs. 67.8% for SCBs and PCBs ownership, respectively. As for pre global financial crisis,
the average SCBs and PCBs generate 95.1% vs. 71.9%, of profit efficiency pre crisis, less than
what was initially expected to be generated. This result shows that the SCBs are generating more
profit compared to the PCBs since the level of the profit efficiency for SCBs are higher than PCBs.
With regards to profit efficiency during crisis period, the results indicate that, on average, the SCBs
and PCBs shows the same findings since the level of profit efficiency of SCBs are higher than
PCBs. This indicate that the SCBs banks have earn 98.8% vs. 77.7%, respectively, of the profit
for the maximum outputs. For profit efficiency post global financial crisis, the results suggest that
the average SCBs and PCBs can only earn 60.1% vs. 67.8% respectively, of what is available.
Both categories of banks ownership lose the prospect of generating 39.9% and 32.2% additional
outputs from the minimum level of inputs, respectively. Although SCBs and PCBs are show a
declining level of profit efficiency after the crisis period, the level of profit efficiency on PCBs are
higher than SCBs.
In conclusion, the empirical findings from this study indicate that although during the period of
global financial crisis increase the profit efficiency to SCBs and PCBs, the ultimate impact of this
crisis reduce the profit efficiency level to both ownership since it can be observed over the post
global financial crisis. Even though PCBs reported an improvement and higher profit efficiency
than SCBs, the efficiency level still lower compared to during financial crisis.
Robustness  test
After examining the results derived from the SBM-DEA method, the issue of interest now is
whether the difference in the profit efficiency level pre, during and post global financial crisis of
the SCBs and PCBs are statistically significant. The Mann–Whitney (Wilcoxon) is a relevant test
for two independent samples coming from populations having the same distribution. The most
relevant reason is that the data violate the stringent assumptions of the independent group’s t-
test. In what follows, we perform the non-parametric Mann–Whitney (Wilcoxon) test along with
a series of other parametric (t-test) and non-parametric Kruskall–Wallis tests to obtain robust
results. Table 4 shows the robustness tests.
The results from the parametric t-test and non-parametric Mann–Whitney (Wilcoxon) test
suggest that the SCBs have exhibited a higher mean profit efficiency level than PCBs peers
pre financial crisis (0.951 > 0.719) and significantly different at 1%. Likewise, the SCBs have
also exhibited a higher mean profit efficiency level during financial crisis compared to PCBs
(0.988 < 0.777) and significantly different at 1%. The results from the parametric t-test are further
confirmed by the non-parametric Mann–Whitney (Wilcoxon) and Kruskall–Wallis tests, but only
for pre financial crisis. The interesting findings seem to suggests that the profit efficiency level of
PCBs are higher than SCBs after the period of financial crisis (0.678 > 0.601). However, the result
on the post global financial crisis shows that the profit efficiency level on PCBs and SCBs are
not significantly different and this indicate that they are behave homogenously during that period.
Thus, we can conclude that in general the financial crisis significantly lead to the lower profit
efficiency level on the Bangladesh banking sector and it can reduce the level of profit efficiency
specifically on both ownership of banks (SCBs and PCBs).
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Table 3
Profit efficiency level pre, during and post global financial crisis on SCBs and PCBs ownership.
No. SCB ownership Global financial crisis No. PCB ownership Global financial crisis
Pre During Post Pre During Post
2004–2006 2007–2008 2009–2011 2004–2006 2007–2008 2009–2011
1 Agrani Bank 1.000 1.000 0.667 1 Arab Bangladesh Bank – – 0.376
2 Janata Bank – – 1.000 2 Bangladesh Commerce Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000
3 Rupali Bank 0.854 0.964 0.239 3 Bank Asia 1.000 1.000 0.625
4 Shahjalal Bank 1.000 1.000 0.499 4 BRAC Bank – – 0.366
5 City Bank – – 0.707
6 Dhaka Bank 0.566 1.000 0.199
7 Dutch-Bangla Bank 0.270 0.045 0.536
8 Eastern Bank – – 0.249
9 Export Import Bank of Bangladesh – – 1.000
10 First Security Bank 0.777 1.000 1.000
11 IFIC Bank 0.729 1.000 0.309
12 Islami Bank Bangladesh 0.797 1.000 1.000
13 Jamuna Bank 0.025 1.000 0.230
14 Mercantile Bank 0.679 0.212 0.419
15 Mutual Trust Bank – – 1.000
16 National Bank 0.435 0.118 0.876
17 National Credit and Commerce Bank 0.669 1.000 1.000
18 One Bank 0.691 0.289 0.487
19 Premier Bank – – 0.544
20 Prime Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000
21 Pubali Bank 0.492 0.199 0.431
22 Sonali Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000
23 Southeast Bank – – 1.000
24 Standard Bank 1.000 1.000 1.000
25 Trust Bank 1.000 0.127 0.671
26 United Commercial Bank – – 0.465
27 Uttara Bank 1.000 1.000 0.680
All mean 0.951 0.988 0.601 All mean 0.719 0.777 0.678
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Table 4
Summary of parametric and non-parametric tests.
Test groups
Parametric test Non-parametric test
Individual tests t-Test Mann–Whitney Kruskall–Wallis
[Wilcoxon rank-sum] test Equality of populations test
Hypothesis Median SCBs = Median PCBs
Profit efficiency t(Prb > t) z(Prb > z) X2 (Prb > X2)
Test statistics Mean t Mean Rank z Mean Rank X2
Pre-crisis
SCBs 0.951 3.126*** 39.222 −1.751* 39.222 3.066*
PCBs 0.719 29.577 29.577
During crisis
SCBs 0.988 3.759*** 27.750 −1.250 27.750 1.563
PCBs 0.777 21.671 21.671
Post-crisis
SCBs 0.601 −0.695 41.167 −0.726 41.167 0.526
PCBs 0.678 46.734 46.734
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Fig. 2. Normality test statistics on SCBs.
Residual  analysis
Result  of  normality  test
Figs. 2 and 3 exhibits the group normality test statistics. The results on PCBs (Fig. 2) revealed
that the group value of skewness is -1.790, which indicates that the data are normal (error variable)
since the value is in the range of ±1.96. Nevertheless, the values of Kurtosis and Jarque–Bera are
not normally distributed because the Kurtosis’s value is not in the range of ±2 and the value of
Jarque–Bera is statistically significant at 1% level. While the results on SCBs shows that (Fig. 3)
although the probability of Jarque–Bera is insignificant and the skewness value is around ±1.96,
the kurtosis (3.977) is not around ±2. Therefore both results indicate that the error variable is not
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Fig. 3. Normality test statistics on PCBs.
normally distributed. Thus, adopting the GLS method in both SCBs and PCBs is more suitable
and is expected to produce better results (Gujarati, 2002).
Result of  heteroscedasticity  test
Tables 5 and 6 exhibits the results of the White General Heteroscedasticity test. The results
of F-test for all SCBs and PCBs models fail to reject the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity
problem, suggesting that the error variance is constant by applying the GLS regression along
with the White’s Heteroscedasticity Consistent Standard Errors technique, the heteroscedasticity
problem in this study was solved (Gujarati, 2002).
Result of  autocorrelations  test
This study used the Durbin-Watson (DW) to test the autocorrelation problems. Tables 7 and 8
show the results of the autocorrelation test on SCBs and PCBs which suggest that the entire
proposed model has no serial correlation or the errors are independent of each others because the
value of the DW statistic is around 2 (Gujarati, 2002).
Determinants  of  proﬁt  efﬁciency  on  SCBs  and  PCBs
In essence, results from the first stage identify the level of profit efficiency of the SCBs and
PCBs for specific year and bank. In what follows, we proceed to identify the internal (bank
specific) and external (macroeconomic) factors which could improve the profit efficiency of
the Bangladesh banking sector (Tables 9 and 10). To do so, we estimate 12 multivariate panel
regression models which are presented in Tables 9 and 10. In Model 1, we report the regression
results for the baseline regression model which include all six bank specific variables namely
LNTA, LNLLRGL, LNETA, LNNIITA, LNNIETA, and LNLOANSTA. In regression Model 2,
we introduce the macroeconomic variables namely LNGDP, LNINFL, and LNCR3, while the
bank specific variables are retained in the regression model. In regression Model 3, we include
the PTC variable to control for the post global financial crisis period.
Models 4–12 represent focused models adopted to identify the potential determinants
of SCBs’ and PCBs’ profit efficiency specifically on post global financial crisis period.
All the bank specific and macroeconomic variables are retained in these models (Model
4–Model 12). This study include interaction variables namely LNTA*PTC, LNLLRGL*PTC,
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Table 5
White general heteroscedasticity test on SCBs.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
F-statistic 1.322 0.346 1.040 1.836 0.544 0.280 0.403 0.321 0.141 0.943 1.651 2.315
Obs R2 1.334 0.354 1.053 1.840 0.554 0.287 0.412 0.328 0.144 0.956 1.659 2.306
Prob. Chi-Sq. χ2 0.248 0.552 0.305 0.175 0.457 0.592 0.521 0.567 0.704 0.328 0.198 0.129
Ho (null-no het-
eroscedasticity
problem)
Fail to reject Ho
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Table 6
White general heteroscedasticity test on PCBs.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
F-statistic 0.744 0.794 0.828 0.755 0.836 0.666 0.820 0.788 0.805 0.829 0.855 0.827
Obs R2 16.235 38.041 51.375 49.945 54.549 46.487 53.817 52.382 52.214 51.421 52.507 51.338
Prob. Chi-Sq. χ2 0.756 0.759 0.718 0.819 0.707 0.915 0.731 0.776 0.753 0.717 0.679 0.720
Ho (null-no het-
eroscedasticity
problem)
Fail to reject Ho
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Table 7
Autocorrelation test using Durbin–Watson test on SCBs.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Durbin–Watson
stat
2.257 2.007 2.004 1.801 2.042 1.991 1.949 1.995 2.027 2.000 2.166 2.004
Sel Est method FE FE RE RE FE FE FE FE RE RE FE RE
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Table 8
Autocorrelation test using Durbin–Watson test on PCBs.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Durbin–Watson
stat
1.956 1.920 1.927 2.317 1.934 2.274 2.299 1.936 1.932 1.927 1.925 1.927
Sel Est method RE RE RE FE RE FE FE RE RE RE RE RE
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Table 9
Multivariate regression analysis on SCBs under ordinary least square model.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
C −7.816*** 8.998*** −8.09 −3.006 6.662 4.74 8.252*** 9.282*** −9.508* −7.81 −1.341 −8.747
(2.618) (3.255) (5.480) (6.345) (4.291) (5.265) (3.027) (3.240) (5.660) (5.468) (5.146) (5.605)
Bank-speciﬁc variables
LNTA 0.361*** 0.638*** 0.835*** 0.842*** 0.647*** 0.633*** 0.671*** 0.639*** 0.842*** 0.833*** 0.790*** 0.834***
(0.127) (0.093) (0.071) (0.105) (0.052) (0.043) (0.064) (0.048) (0.072) (0.071) (0.075) (0.069)
LNLLRGL 0.012 0.075 −0.053 −0.006 0.079 0.034 0.068 0.076 −0.049 −0.051 −0.011 −0.049
(0.062) (0.052) (0.077) (0.078) (0.049) (0.068) (0.055) (0.053) (0.075) (0.077) (0.077) (0.074)
LNNIITA −0.556*** −0.640*** −0.714*** −0.758*** −0.621*** −0.542*** −0.661*** −0.656*** −0.733*** −0.713*** −0.693*** −0.717***
(0.113) (0.130) (0.046) (0.064) (0.075) (0.046) (0.096) (0.068) (0.042) (0.047) (0.050) (0.045)
LNETA 0.077 0.674*** 0.741*** 0.772*** 0.673*** 0.614*** 0.719*** 0.666*** 0.727*** 0.740*** 0.716*** 0.738***
(0.053) (0.129) (0.020) (0.024) (0.059) (0.066) (0.032) (0.036) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021)
LNNIETA 0.237*** 0.059 0.292*** 0.246*** 0.129*** 0.116* 0.084** 0.044 0.296*** 0.288*** 0.202*** 0.294***
(0.065) (0.060) (0.062) (0.072) (0.048) (0.065) (0.040) (0.054) (0.061) (0.062) (0.054) (0.063)
LNLOANSTA 3.278*** 2.158*** 3.043*** 2.908*** 1.765*** 2.271*** 2.273*** 2.220*** 3.490*** 3.037*** 2.914*** 3.106***
(1.093) (0.740) (0.348) (0.524) (0.505) (0.527) (0.544) (0.467) (0.393) (0.350) (0.436) (0.364)
Macroeconomic variables
LNGDP −5.385*** 0.655 −1.203 −4.269*** −3.973*** −5.067*** −5.584*** 0.736 0.577 −1.576 0.613
(0.916) (1.757) (1.905) (0.989) (1.268) (0.535) (0.666) (1.715) (1.753) (1.554) (1.737)
LNINFL 0.896*** −1.465** −0.808 0.410** 0.578*** 0.705*** 0.979*** −1.406** −1.411** −0.168 −1.508**
(0.128) (0.594) (0.632) (0.196) (0.166) (0.073) (0.138) (0.559) (0.584) (0.324) (0.602)
LNCR3 1.008*** −1.576*** −0.996 0.732* 0.684* 0.668 1.146** −1.430*** −1.599*** −1.405** −1.139***
(0.366) (0.505) (0.617) (0.416) (0.378) (0.513) (0.498) (0.442) (0.514) (0.583) (0.402)
PTC −0.961***
(0.242)
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Table 9 (Continued)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Bank-speciﬁc on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNTA*PTC −0.137***
(0.050)
LNLLRGL*PTC −0.268***
(0.092)
LNNIITA*PTC −0.337
(0.221)
LNETA*PTC −0.121
(0.087)
LNNIETA*PTC 0.091
(0.156)
LNLOANSTA*PTC −0.523***
(0.128)
Macroeconomic on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNGDP*PTC −0.269***
(0.068)
LNINFL*PTC −0.777***
(0.244)
LNCR3*PTC −0.581***
(0.146)
R2 0.292 0.585 0.776 0.709 0.638 0.621 0.59 0.587 0.777 0.774 0.715 0.777
Adj R2 0.235 0.533 0.744 0.667 0.586 0.567 0.531 0.528 0.746 0.742 0.674 0.745
F-statistic 5.095*** 11.143*** 24.301*** 17.017*** 12.327*** 11.479*** 10.068*** 9.949*** 24.436*** 24.005*** 17.578*** 24.333***
Durbin–Watson stat 1.544 1.901 2.011 1.82 1.673 1.873 1.951 1.914 2.048 2.008 1.938 2.000
No. of Obs. 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Figure in parentheses () are standard error.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
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Table 10
Multivariate regression analysis on PCBs under ordinary least square model.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
C −1.016 −3.324 0.815 0.336 −3.443 −2.768 −0.485 −4.307* 1.056 0.756 −0.816 0.864
(0.677) (2.613) (1.146) (1.040) (2.569) (1.795) (1.136) (2.280) (1.166) (1.139) (1.162) (1.219)
Bank-speciﬁc variables
LNTA 0.084*** 0.118** 0.107** 0.076 0.114** 0.116** 0.108** 0.119** 0.110** 0.107** 0.109** 0.107**
(0.027) (0.049) (0.050) (0.057) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
LNLLRGL 0.016 0.053 0.109 0.114 0.042 0.064 0.081 0.037 0.118 0.109 0.099 0.107
(0.094) (0.076) (0.091) (0.093) (0.083) (0.081) (0.079) (0.079) (0.092) (0.091) (0.093) (0.091)
LNNIITA −0.344*** −0.406*** −0.454*** −0.439*** −0.416*** −0.521** −0.506*** −0.354*** −0.448*** −0.454*** −0.454*** −0.453***
(0.110) (0.118) (0.124) (0.120) (0.119) (0.220) (0.146) (0.124) (0.123) (0.125) (0.129) (0.125)
LNETA 0.175*** 0.261* 0.268** 0.239* 0.241 0.238 0.182 0.268* 0.291** 0.268** 0.267** 0.268**
(0.052) (0.138) (0.124) (0.124) (0.148) (0.156) (0.143) (0.141) (0.124) (0.124) (0.127) (0.124)
LNNIETA −0.360 −0.266 −0.202 −0.189 −0.229 −0.242 −0.200 −0.245 −0.211 −0.202 −0.206 −0.206
(0.224) (0.232) (0.263) (0.264) (0.233) (0.232) (0.246) (0.185) (0.268) (0.263) (0.256) (0.262)
LNLOANSTA 0.322 0.340 0.567 0.626 0.395 0.431 0.524 0.238 0.473 0.566 0.511 0.555
(0.357) (0.321) (0.392) (0.402) (0.343) (0.341) (0.375) (0.344) (0.363) (0.392) (0.383) (0.391)
Macroeconomic variables
LNGDP 0.117 −2.136*** −1.980*** 0.069 −0.232 −1.564** 0.686 −2.177*** −2.121*** −1.499** −2.041***
(0.722) (0.673) (0.689) (0.714) (0.414) (0.603) (0.632) (0.653) (0.675) (0.667) (0.677)
LNINFL 0.282*** 1.288*** 1.250*** 0.339** 0.449** 1.061*** 0.022 1.304*** 1.272*** 0.809*** 1.280***
(0.069) (0.362) (0.394) (0.145) (0.226) (0.358) (0.226) (0.357) (0.360) (0.283) (0.381)
LNCR3 0.832*** 2.235*** 2.250*** 0.927*** 1.063** 2.052*** 0.478 2.249*** 2.249*** 2.211** 2.025***
(0.254) (0.702) (0.788) (0.292) (0.457) (0.753) (0.479) (0.700) (0.712) (0.890) (0.653)
PTC 0.408**
(0.159)
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Table 10 (Continued)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Bank-speciﬁc on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNTA*PTC 0.079**
(0.035)
LNLLRGL*PTC 0.055
(0.107)
LNNIITA*PTC 0.184
(0.225)
LNETA*PTC 0.372***
(0.181)
LNNIETA*PTC −0.240
(0.206)
LNLOANSTA*PTC 0.221***
(0.084)
Macroeconomic on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNGDP*PTC 0.115**
(0.045)
LNINFL*PTC 0.374*
(0.199)
LNCR3*PTC 0.241**
(0.099)
R2 0.124 0.126 0.172 0.178 0.126 0.130 0.162 0.120 0.176 0.171 0.156 0.169
Adj R2 0.092 0.076 0.119 0.126 0.070 0.075 0.109 0.065 0.124 0.119 0.103 0.117
F-statistic 3.834*** 2.540*** 3.275*** 3.428*** 2.268*** 2.358*** 3.061*** 2.162*** 3.386*** 3.266*** 2.926*** 3.220***
Durbin–Watson stat 1.679 1.678 1.706 1.708 1.678 1.674 1.706 1.668 1.717 1.705 1.702 1.707
No. of Obs. 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
Figure in parentheses () are standard error.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
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Table 11
Panel regression analysis on SCBs under fixed and random effects model.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
C −4.617*** −7.910** 3.929** 2.961 −7.843* −7.146 −5.735 −4.130 −0.068 3.036 4.201 −0.925
(1.426) (3.046) (1.563) (4.072) (4.206) (5.293) (4.052) (5.953) (1.124) (4.721) (2.849) (5.924)
Bank-speciﬁc variables
LNTA −0.250** 0.357*** 0.099** 0.700*** 0.269*** 0.790*** 0.187*** 0.830*** −0.110** 0.663*** 0.100* 0.690***
(0.105) (0.144) (0.054) (0.050) (0.070) (0.081) (0.050) (0.109) (0.049) (0.058) (0.054) (0.047)
LNLLRGL −0.055 −0.117 −0.031 −0.066 −0.087 −0.125 −0.083 −0.105 −0.023 0.010 −0.028 −0.101
(0.049) (0.064) (0.031) (0.109) (0.061) (0.097) (0.060) (0.102) (0.034) (0.062) (0.026) (0.117)
LNNIITA −1.046*** −0.505* −0.784*** −0.563*** −0.742*** −0.567*** −0.795*** −0.617*** −0.755*** −0.530*** −0.814*** −0.452***
(0.211) (0.262) (0.199) (0.109) (0.146) (0.112) (0.171) (0.127) (0.199) (0.118) (0.123) (0.107)
LNETA 0.278*** 0.085 0.290*** 0.563*** 0.591*** 0.699*** 0.562*** 0.729*** 0.295*** 0.602*** 0.285*** 0.539***
(0.093) (0.136) (0.037) (0.086) (0.057) (0.040) (0.058) (0.045) (0.052) (0.083) (0.051) (0.076)
LNNIETA 0.016 0.319*** −0.086** 0.174** 0.206** 0.354*** 0.162** 0.326*** 0.038 0.192*** −0.095 0.235**
(0.055) (0.096) (0.042) (0.084) (0.089) (0.082) (0.089) (0.093) (0.027) (0.050) (0.061) (0.101)
LNLOANSTA 3.279*** 3.321** 0.753 2.531*** 2.564*** 2.476*** 2.210*** 2.448*** −0.011 1.680*** 0.723 2.505***
(0.783) (1.314) (0.616) (0.586) (0.420) (0.427) (0.438) (0.526) (0.728) (0.583) (0.842) (0.542)
Macroeconomic variables
LNGDP −2.337*** −4.285*** 1.368 0.527 0.848 −0.715 −0.089 −3.391*** −2.434*** −2.836*
(0.208) (0.786) (1.313) (1.853) (1.269) (1.991) (0.329) (1.127) (0.624) (1.555)
LNINFL 1.056*** 0.900*** −0.957** −1.462** −0.569 −1.000 0.360*** 0.217 1.107*** 0.396
(0.074) (0.152) (0.563) (0.659) (0.490) (0.706) (0.108) (0.209) (0.145) (0.252)
LNCR3 0.897*** 1.768*** −1.234** −1.135 −0.980** −0.699 0.408 1.238*** 0.944** 1.405***
(0.315) (0.403) (0.499) (0.844) (0.480) (0.910) (0.464) (0.416) (0.435) (0.420)
PTC −0.790*** −0.937***
(0.234) (0.289)
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Table 11 (Continued)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
Bank-speciﬁc on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNTA*PTC −0.128*** −0.150**
(0.042) (0.060)
LNLLRGL*PTC −0.455*** −0.361***
(0.069) (0.104)
LNNIITA*PTC 0.042 −0.460
(0.162) (0.328)
LNETA*PTC
LNNIETA*PTC
LNLOANSTA*PTC
Macroeconomic on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNGDP*PTC
LNINFL*PTC
LNCR3*PTC
R2 0.58 0.295 0.707 0.635 0.797 0.741 0.779 0.705 0.814 0.683 0.71 0.655
Adj R2 0.467 0.237 0.609 0.589 0.725 0.704 0.701 0.663 0.747 0.638 0.607 0.606
F-statistic 5.125*** 5.149*** 7.242*** 13.743*** 11.038*** 20.062*** 9.915*** 16.740*** 12.271*** 15.091*** 6.875*** 13.279***
Durbin–Watson stat 2.257 1.412 2.007 1.665 2.276 2.004 2.202 1.801 2.042 1.521 1.991 1.756
BP & LM x2 5.030** 4.560** 6.090** 5.370** 1.720** 3.460**
Hausman x2 25.910*** 32.950*** 10.19 2.58 50.150*** 52.040***
Sel Est method FE FE RE RE FE FE
No. of Obs. 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
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Table 11 (Continued)
Variable Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
C 6.047*** 2.601 3.939 2.864 −8.206* −8.775 −7.583* −6.959 −2.047 −2.711 −8.643* −7.632
(1.415) (3.878) (2.485) (4.690) (4.352) (5.617) (4.166) (5.263) (3.193) (4.609) (4.442) (5.470)
Bank-speciﬁc variables
LNTA −0.111*** 0.727*** 0.105* 0.704*** 0.298*** 0.804*** 0.266*** 0.789*** 0.197*** 0.776*** 0.260*** 0.788***
(0.039) (0.064) (0.046) (0.076) (0.079) (0.083) (0.069) (0.081) (0.054) (0.082) (0.069) (0.080)
LNLLRGL −0.041 −0.075 −0.031 −0.067 −0.077 −0.127 −0.086 −0.125 −0.059 −0.117 −0.084 −0.122
(0.032) (0.109) (0.031) (0.116) (0.058) (0.096) (0.061) (0.097) (0.054) (0.103) (0.059) (0.095)
LNNIITA −0.735*** −0.584*** −0.796*** −0.560*** −0.764*** −0.587*** −0.742*** −0.566*** −0.741*** −0.545*** −0.742*** −0.568***
(0.198) (0.119) (0.202) (0.112) (0.142) (0.112) (0.148) (0.112) (0.176) (0.113) (0.146) (0.113)
LNETA −0.062 0.604*** 0.286*** 0.567*** 0.566*** 0.680*** 0.587*** 0.697*** 0.493*** 0.660*** 0.603*** 0.698***
(0.070) (0.086) (0.058) (0.067) (0.050) (0.040) (0.056) (0.040) (0.046) (0.041) (0.061) (0.040)
LNNIETA −0.206*** 0.190** −0.085 0.179 0.196** 0.361*** 0.202 0.351*** 0.087* 0.282*** 0.214 0.356***
(0.041) (0.083) (0.062) (0.111) (0.087) (0.081) (0.089) (0.081) (0.073) (0.078) (0.092) (0.083)
LNLOANSTA −0.923 2.564*** 0.721 2.510*** 2.805*** 2.965*** 2.542*** 2.474*** 2.072*** 2.478*** 2.741*** 2.506***
(0.715) (0.565) (0.690) (0.519) (0.483) (0.502) (0.420) (0.427) (0.425) (0.459) (0.464) (0.440)
Macroeconomic variables
LNGDP −2.441*** −4.111*** −2.346*** −4.216*** 1.163 0.655 1.3 0.476 −0.412 −1.050 1.385 0.465
(0.297) (0.755) (0.624) (1.239) (1.263) (1.840) (1.302) (1.846) (0.934) (1.610) (1.319) (1.849)
LNINFL 1.762*** 0.780*** 1.073*** 0.864*** −0.809 −1.434*** −0.904 −1.417*** 0.226 −0.297 −1.037** −1.505***
(0.182) (0.163) (0.115) (0.264) (0.522) (0.633) (0.550) (0.648) (0.242) (0.355) (0.592) (0.680)
LNCR3 1.993*** 1.567*** 0.920** 1.714*** −1.012*** −1.009 −1.245** −1.162 −0.866** −1.093 −0.919** −0.723
(0.484) (0.499) (0.420) (0.453) (0.434) (0.798) (0.503) (0.855) (0.421) (0.956) (0.411) (0.738)
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Table 11 (Continued)
Variable Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
PTC
Bank-speciﬁc on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNTA*PTC
LNLLRGL*PTC
LNNIITA*PTC
LNETA*PTC 0.393*** −0.083
(0.075) (0.063)
LNNIETA*PTC 0.008 −0.039
(0.154) (0.294)
LNLOANSTA*PTC −0.408*** −0.511***
(0.121) (0.156)
Macroeconomic on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNGDP*PTC −0.220*** −0.263***
(0.065) (0.081)
LNINFL*PTC −0.564*** −0.840***
(0.194) (0.303)
LNCR3*PTC −0.485*** −0.568***
(0.144) (0.177)
R2 0.736 0.637 0.711 0.635 0.792 0.742 0.796 0.740 0.756 0.709 0.796 0.740
Adj R2 0.642 0.585 0.608 0.583 0.718 0.705 0.723 0.703 0.669 0.667 0.724 0.703
F-statistic 7.830*** 12.266*** 6.912*** 12.200*** 10.698*** 20.119*** 10.937*** 19.952*** 8.706*** 17.024*** 10.969*** 19.945***
Durbin–Watson stat 1.949 1.705 1.995 1.662 2.254 2.027 2.271 2.000 2.166 1.905 2.28 2.004
BP & LM x2 4.270** 3.060** 4.790** 4.560** 4.500** 4.590**
Hausman x2 24.730*** 32.540*** 8.95 11.66 25.330** 11.68
Sel Est method FE FE RE RE FE RE
No. of Obs. 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Figure in parentheses () are standard error.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
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Table 12
Panel regression analysis on PCBs under fixed and random effects model.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
C −1.300*** −2.210** −4.554** −5.002 −2.614 −0.729 −2.419 −1.666 −4.491** −5.076 −4.673** −4.249
(0.425) (0.855) (1.875) (5.407) (2.087) (5.579) (2.118) (5.533) (1.979) (5.236) (1.840) (4.813)
Bank-speciﬁc variables
LNTA −0.034*** 0.087 −0.093 0.222*** −0.136 0.211*** −0.124 0.190*** −0.090 0.213*** −0.095 0.220***
(0.005) (0.099) (0.130) (0.065) (0.173) (0.065) (0.182) (0.062) (0.133) (0.063) (0.146) (0.067)
LNLLRGL −0.003 0.008 −0.055 0.023 −0.027 0.041 −0.018 0.053 −0.056* −0.026 −0.057 0.035
(0.022) (0.055) (0.035) (0.068) (0.034) (0.074) (0.040) (0.073) (0.030) (0.067) (0.036) (0.066)
LNNIITA −0.024 −0.268 −0.077 −0.338 −0.131 −0.397* −0.135 −0.400* −0.079 −0.326 −0.068 −0.426
(0.034) (0.195) (0.086) (0.229) (0.145) (0.230) (0.147) (0.230) (0.091) (0.232) (0.140) (0.327)
LNETA 0.099*** 0.046 0.020 0.322 −0.017 0.285 −0.057 0.305 0.017 0.251 0.019 0.316
(0.024) (0.159) (0.112) (0.211) (0.113) (0.218) (0.131) (0.217) (0.099) (0.229) (0.122) (0.245)
LNNIETA −0.127*** −0.350 −0.018 −0.357 0.040 −0.321 0.036 −0.326 −0.016 −0.310 −0.018 −0.353
(0.035) (0.336) (0.059) (0.354) (0.103) (0.375) (0.096) (0.380) (0.060) (0.356) (0.072) (0.361)
LNLOANSTA 0.618** 0.941* 0.476 0.808 0.542 0.970 0.577 0.928 0.488 1.017 0.492 0.842
(0.238) (0.538) (0.413) (0.634) (0.423) (0.715) (0.445) (0.693) (0.465) (0.730) (0.421) (0.610)
Macroeconomic variables
LNGDP 0.898 −0.285 −0.062 −2.485 −0.204 −2.028 0.862 −0.483 0.925 −0.636
(0.782) (1.544) (0.848) (2.085) (0.872) (2.083) (0.869) (1.581) (0.769) (1.381)
LNINFL 0.045 0.785*** 0.528** 1.721*** 0.578** 1.531*** 0.057 0.931*** 0.046 0.937**
(0.035) (0.109) (0.251) (0.470) (0.275) (0.505) (0.072) (0.224) (0.080) (0.414)
LNCR3 0.411*** 1.538** 1.036** 2.904*** 1.135** 2.716*** 0.421*** 1.738*** 0.414** 1.725**
(0.131) (0.668) (0.405) (0.580) (0.446) (0.681) (0.114) (0.597) (0.182) (0.853)
PTC 0.189* 0.408**
(0.106) (0.199)
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Table 12 (Continued)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
Bank-speciﬁc on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNTA*PTC 0.042* 0.069
(0.024) (0.045)
LNLLRGL*PTC 0.012 0.170
(0.055) (0.164)
LNNIITA*PTC −0.005 0.134
(0.078) (0.314)
LNETA*PTC
LNNIETA*PTC
LNLOANSTA*PTC
Macroeconomic on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNGDP*PTC
LNINFL*PTC
LNCR3*PTC
R2 0.990 0.028 0.996 0.061 0.703 0.070 0.722 0.071 0.980 0.062 0.933 0.063
Adj R2 0.987 −0.008 0.995 0.008 0.622 0.011 0.647 0.012 0.974 0.002 0.915 0.004
F-statistic 414.962*** 0.784 918.943*** 1.153 8.677*** 1.192 9.538*** 1.205 176.852*** 1.040 51.373*** 1.061
Durbin–Watson stat 2.248 1.956 2.266 1.920 2.307 1.927 2.317 1.884 2.267 1.934 2.274 1.909
BP & LM x2 212.210*** 421.840*** 421.540*** 383.960*** 413.960*** 411.890***
Hausman x2 11.881 16.6 17.988 22.235** 15.869 18.359**
Sel Est method RE RE RE FE RE FE
No. of Obs. 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
736
 
F.
 K
am
arudin
 et
 al.
 /
 Contaduría
 y
 Adm
inistra
ción
 61
 (2016)
 705–745
Table 12 (Continued)
Variable Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
C −3.249 −1.447 −4.194** −6.861 −2.822 −0.681 −2.650 −0.799 −3.609* −2.431 −2.672 −0.511
(2.114) (4.696) (2.139) (6.037) (2.091) (5.498) (2.081) (5.573) (2.055) (5.381) (2.146) (5.593)
Bank-speciﬁc variables
LNTA −0.094 0.203*** −0.078 0.216*** −0.159 0.212*** −0.136 0.211*** −0.125 0.212*** −0.134 0.211***
(0.164) (0.063) (0.138) (0.063) (0.183) (0.066) (0.172) (0.065) (0.160) (0.065) (0.173) (0.065)
LNLLRGL −0.038 0.041 −0.051 0.001 −0.027 0.043 −0.028 0.041 −0.036 0.038 −0.029 0.041
(0.029) (0.067) (0.038) (0.063) (0.034) (0.075) (0.034) (0.074) (0.033) (0.073) (0.034) (0.074)
LNNIITA −0.142 −0.446* −0.084 −0.293 −0.130 −0.395* −0.131 −0.397* −0.108 −0.390* −0.129 −0.399*
(0.162) (0.238) (0.125) (0.250) (0.145) (0.231) (0.145) (0.230) (0.141) (0.233) (0.147) (0.231)
LNETA 0.013 0.208 0.015 0.330 −0.018 0.293 −0.017 0.285 −0.009 0.291 −0.017 0.285
(0.107) (0.244) (0.111) (0.206) (0.116) (0.218) (0.113) (0.218) (0.109) (0.219) (0.113) (0.218)
LNNIETA 0.047 −0.324 −0.023 −0.265 0.036 −0.321 0.040 −0.321 0.022 −0.330 0.037 −0.324
(0.112) (0.378) (0.054) (0.220) (0.105) (0.373) (0.103) (0.375) (0.092) (0.373) (0.102) (0.374)
LNLOANSTA 0.529 0.920 0.496 0.685 0.496 0.873 0.541 0.968 0.500 0.907 0.529 0.969
(0.409) (0.651) (0.410) (0.594) (0.417) (0.686) (0.423) (0.714) (0.408) (0.685) (0.420) (0.713)
Macroeconomic variables
LNGDP 0.188 −2.220 0.731 0.620 0.061 −2.439 −0.051 −2.465 0.360 −1.837 0.012 −2.474
(0.828) (1.675) (0.894) (1.830) (0.836) (2.032) (0.846) (2.085) (0.823) (1.985) (0.862) (2.046)
LNINFL 0.355* 1.619*** 0.087 0.455 0.518** 1.703*** 0.518** 1.703*** 0.257* 1.258*** 0.513** 1.749***
(0.197) (0.394) (0.095) (0.530) (0.252) (0.437) (0.247) (0.467) (0.143) (0.345) (0.255) (0.473)
LNCR3 0.878** 2.968*** 0.460** 1.071 1.026** 2.889*** 1.040** 2.916*** 0.914** 2.896*** 0.934** 2.736***
(0.405) (0.739) (0.207) (1.044) (0.413) (0.574) (0.409) (0.591) (0.406) (0.826) (0.367) (0.545)
PTC
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Table 12 (Continued)
Variable Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE
Bank-speciﬁc on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNTA*PTC
LNLLRGL*PTC
LNNIITA*PTC
LNETA*PTC 0.135 0.428**
(0.095) (0.194)
LNNIETA*PTC 0.039 −0.314
(0.118) (0.415)
LNLOANSTA*PTC 0.100* 0.218**
(0.057) (0.103)
Macroeconomic on post global ﬁnancial crisis variables
LNGDP*PTC 0.053* 0.114**
(0.030) (0.056)
LNINFL*PTC 0.142 0.375
(0.099) (0.240)
LNCR3*PTC 0.109* 0.250**
(0.064) (0.120)
R2 0.642 0.075 0.934 0.064 0.694 0.070 0.704 0.070 0.738 0.068 0.695 0.070
Adj R2 0.545 0.017 0.916 0.004 0.610 0.011 0.623 0.011 0.667 0.009 0.611 0.011
F-statistic 6.584*** 1.282 52.138*** 1.071 8.311*** 1.190 8.722*** 1.191 10.330*** 1.145 8.345*** 1.195
Durbin–Watson stat 2.299 1.891 2.270 1.936 2.309 1.932 2.306 1.927 2.296 1.925 2.306 1.927
BP & LM x2 418.300*** 418.040*** 422.320*** 421.550*** 421.930*** 421.520***
Hausman x2 20.808** 16.544 17.682 17.986 17.849 17.926
Sel Est method FE RE RE RE RE RE
No. of Obs. 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
Figure in parentheses () are standard error.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
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LNNIITA*PTC, LNETA*PTC, LNNIETA*PTC, LNLOANSTA*PTC, LNGDP*PTC,
LNINFL*PTC and LNCR3*PTC.
Tables 9 and 10 summarize that, size (LNTA) reveals a positive relationship with profit effi-
ciency for both SCBs and PCBs and this is statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels (except
Model 4 of Table 10). This result implies that the larger (smaller) size banks tend to exhibit higher
(lower) profit efficiency. This provide support to the argument that large banks may benefit from
economies of scale which enables them to generate higher profits. Large banks may achieve higher
profit efficiency levels because their costs are compensated by higher profits that are generated via
quality services. Besides, large banks may have better capabilities to capitalize on profit enhance-
ment activities and better cost cutting opportunities compared to their smaller bank counterparts.
This result is consistent with study such as Sufian et al. (2012) providing support to the argument
that big banks have high efficiency levels compared to medium and small banks.
The coefficient of LNNIITA has consistently exhibits a negative sign (statistically significant
at the 5% level or better) for both banks (Tables 9 and 10). The results imply that banks which
derived a higher proportion of its income from non-interest sources such as fee based services
tend to be relatively less efficient in their intermediation function. The finding is in consonance
with the earlier studies by among others Sufian and Habibullah (2009b) and Stiroh (2006). To
recap, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) find that diversification benefits of the U.S. financial holding
companies are offset by the increased exposure to non-interest activities, which are much more
volatile, but not necessarily more profitable than interest generating activities.
With regard to the impact of capitalization (LNETA) on profit efficiency it can be observed
from Tables 9 and 10 that the coefficient LNETA exhibits a positive sign for both SCBs and
PCBs (except Model 1 of Table 9 and Models 5,6,7 of Table 10). The positive coefficient of
capitalization signifies the positive relationship between capitalization and profit efficiency of the
banks where the well-capitalized banks would increase banks’ revenue and profitability due to
the lower expected costs of financial distress, lower expected bankruptcy costs, and lower risk
of portfolio. Such advantages will then be translated into high profitability (Demirguc-Kunt &
Huizinga, 1999).
Likewise, it can be observed from Table 9 that the overhead expenses (LNNIETA) and liquidity
(LNLOANSTA) have significant positive relationship only in SCBs at the 1% level. The LNNIETA
is the proxy of overhead expenses applied to provide the information on variation in operating costs
across the financial system. It reflects employment, total amount of wages and salaries, as well as
the cost of running branch office facilities. The positive sign indicates that higher profit earned by
banks that are more efficient may be appropriated in the form of higher payroll expenditures paid
to the more productive human capital. This ensures a high SCBs profit efficiency in Bangladesh.
On the other hand, referring to the impact of bank’s loan intensity or liquidity, we find
that LNLOANSTA is positively related only to the profit efficiency of SCBs operating in the
Bangladesh banks. This finding implies that the higher the liquidity is, the higher the SCBs profit
efficiency is. Higher liquidity is required to fund large loans in order to increase the profitability
of the banks. The liquidity risk arises from the possible inability of banks to accommodate declin-
ing liabilities or to provide funds on the assets’ side of the balance sheet. This is considered an
important determinant of the banks’ efficiency. Higher expected return is expected to be generated
from the risky loan market (bank’s asset). Thus, a higher liquidity is required to fund large loans
in order to increase the profitability of the SCBs and this implies that liquidity has a positive
relationship with banks’ profit efficiency.
The findings suggest that the coefficient for economic growth (LNGDP) is negative for both
SCBs (refer Models 2,5,6,7,8 of Table 9) and PCBs (refer Models 3,4,7,9,10,11,12 of Table 10).
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The negative sign indicates that the higher the economic growth is, the lower the bank profit
efficiency is. This result may be due to the volatile economic growth that drives banks to suffer
from lower demand for their financial services, increased loan defaults and thus depleted outputs.
This study discover that, the coefficient of LNINFL and lnCR3 are mixed (positive and negative)
in SCBs but produce consistently positive sign in PCBs. On one hand,the LNINFL variable is
positive sign indicates the banks will charge a higher interest rate and obtain higher profit. The
banks may obtain higher income since the number of borrowers increases even though the interest
rate is higher because the consumer assumes there will be much higher inflation for the future
that will lead to further increase in interest rates. On the other hands, the negative relationship
indicate that the borrowers will react negatively to the increase in inflation as they believe the rate
of inflation may be reduced in the future.
Furthermore, the lnCR3 has a positive sign under both SCBs and PCBs providing support to
the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis. The SCP theory posits that the SCBs and
PCBs banks in a highly concentrated market tend to collude, and therefore earn monopoly profits.
The higher the bank concentration is, the lower the cost of collusion between firms or banks
is. This will lead to higher bank profitability. Market concentration reveals the monopoly power
of the banks. This explains the positive relationship between market concentrations with bank
efficiency. Meanwhile the coefficient of market concentration (lnCR3) also exhibits a negative
sign for SCB banks (Table 9). The negative sign for market concentration in SCBs imply that
increased bank concentration (by increasing the credit cost) will reduce the firms’ demand for
credit and consequently retard or slow down the growth of the economy.
Finally, it is discovered that the impact of global financial crisis or post global financial cri-
sis (PTC) is significantly negative and positively to the profit efficiency of the SCBs and PCBs.
The negative sign in Table 9 indicate that the SCBs banks’ funding structure depends mostly on
wholesale funding that consists of funding from other nonbank investors, other banks, corpo-
rate treasuries and money market funds. This wholesale funding that is practised by the banks is
more exposed to the liquidity risk that can be disseminated via the financial sector’s interlinked
relationship which contributes the banks’ vulnerability to liquidity shocks. Therefore, the finan-
cial crisis lead to liquidity shock that hitting one bank may lead to bank runs on solvent banks
since depositors may assume that the whole banking system is bogged with insufficient liquidity.
Liquidity shock limits the banks capabilities to run their operation and lead to lower banks’ profit
efficiency. It could also cause bankruptcies in the banking system (Smolo & Mirakhor, 2010).
Meanwhile, the coefficient of the PTC exhibits an positive relationship with the PCBs’ profit
efficiency in Table 10. This indicates that global financial crisis may increase the banks’
profit efficiency due to the excess liquidity in their accounts. Therefore, PCBs need to hold mas-
sive cash or very low return assets as their liquid assets in order to avoid liquidity risk. Because
of this reason, the PCBs are stable during the financial crisis in contrast to SCBs.
Determinants  of  proﬁt  efﬁciency  on  SCBs  and  PCBs  speciﬁcally  on  post  global  ﬁnancial  crisis
The internal and external determinants of SCBs and PCBs profit efficiency may react differ-
ently on post global financial crisis. In what precedes, we seek to identify factors which influence
the profit efficiency of the both banks on post global financial crisis. To do so, we include the
interactions of all the bank specific and macroeconomic determinants against the PTC variable. As
a result, 9 new bank specific interaction variables namely LNTA*PTC, LNLLRGL*PTC, LNNI-
ITA*PTC, LNETA*PTC, LNNIETA*PTC, LNLOANSTA*PTC, LNGDP*PTC, LNINFL*PTC
and LNCR3*PTC are introduced in regression Models 4 to 12 respectively.
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The empirical findings presented in Model 4,7,11,12 of Table 10 suggest that the result of
LNTA*PTC, LNETA*PTC, LNINFL*PTC and LNCR3*PTC coefficient remain the same on
PCBs but not SCBs. The LNTA*PTC, LNINFL*PTC, LNCR3*PTC variables changed the sign to
negative and it should be noted that the coefficient of the LNETA*PTC is statistically insignificant
after controlling the post global financial crisis period in SCBs (Table 9).
The size of banks (LNTA*PTC) turn negative to SCBs (Table 9). The empirical findings
presented in Model 4 of Tables 9 and 10 suggest that the sign of LNTA*PTC coefficient remain
the same on PCBs but turn negative to SCBs. The large SCBs operate at diseconomies of scale
since banks only enjoy small increase of output although the inputs are proportionately increased.
Besides, large banks have the capabilities to increase the diversification to reduce the credit risk
but it would drive the returns lower. Indirectly, this indicates that the effect of large SCBs size can
be negative with the banks’ profitability on post global financial crisis
Furthermore, the LNLLRGL*PTC have a negatively significant only to the SCBs profit
efficiency. This implies that SCBs with a higher credit risk will have lower bank efficiency.
A higher credit risk means that banks may deal with a higher possibility that its loans will become
non-performing. Thus, the higher credit risk indicates the higher possibility of the banks to be
confronted with unpaid loans and increasing of the non-performing loans, which both, imply
lower asset quality.
Turning to the liquidity variable, the empirical findings seem to suggest the LNLOANSTA*PTC
turns into negative and significant with the SCBs profit efficiency but positively to PCBs after
controlling the post global financial crisis. The negative LNLOANSTA*PTC to the SCBs profit
efficiency indicate that a high amount of liquidity could have an effect on the banks during a weak
economy (global financial crisis). Borrowers are likely to default on their loans and this drives
lower profitability.
A closer examination on the variable of economic growth on post global financial crisis indi-
cates a changing sign to positive relationship with the profit efficiency of the PCBs (Model 11 of
Table 11) but remain the same on SCBs. The positive LNGDP*PTC signify that the favourable
economic conditions during the global financial crisis period have fuelled higher demand for PCBs
products and services, reducing default loan probabilities and thus increasing the profitability of
the PCBs. High economic growth motivates PCBs to serve more loans and improve the quality
of their assets.
Main  results:  controlling  for  heteroscedasticity
In general, the preliminary results obtained using the OLS as an estimation model indi-
cate that the coefficients of LNTA*PTC, LNLLRGL*PTC, LNLOANSTA*PTC, LNGDP*PTC,
LNINFL*PTC and LNCR3*PTC represent as the determinants that negatively influence the
level of SCBs profit efficiency specifically on post global financial crisis period (Table 9).
Meanwhile, the coefficients of LNTA*PTC, LNETA*PTC, LNLOANSTA*PTC, LNGDP*PTC,
LNINFL*PTC and LNCR3*PTC are significantly positive with the PCBs profit efficiency after
controlling the period of global financial crisis (Table 10). However, this study proceed the analy-
sis using the GLS estimation method in order to obtain robust results. Therefore the main results
are based on regression models under this estimation method.
The Generalized Least Square (GLS) comprising the Fixed Effect (FE) and Random Effect (RE)
method is used for the robustness test rather than the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) as method of
estimation to estimate the panel data regression formed. The decision is made following Gujarati’s
(2002) suggestion that GLS may overcome the heteroscedasticity, resulted from utilizing financial
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data with differences in sizes. Due to the fact that the sample employed in this study consists of
small and large banks, differences in sizes of the observations are expected to be observed. The
usual practice of econometrics modelling assumes that error is constant over all time periods and
locations due to the existence of homoscedascity. Nevertheless, problems could arise which lead
to heteroscedasticity issues as variance of the error term produced from regression tend not to be
constant, which is caused by variations of sizes in the observation. Therefore, the estimates of the
dependent variable will be less predictable (Gujarati, 2002).
The results from Tables 11 and 12 shows that the panel data is most suitable to be used in
this study since the p-value of the Breusch Pagan and Lagrangian Multiplier (BP and LM) Chi-
Square (χ2) test is significant at 5% and 1% levels in all models. Furthermore, the selection of
estimation method of FE (significant at 5% or better levels) and RE (insignificant) regression
analysis are based on the Chi-Square (χ2) of the Hausman test. The results clearly indicate that
the FE is preferable in Models (1,2,5,6,7,8,11 of Table 11 and 4,6,7 of Table 12) and RE is
suitable in Models (3,4,9,10,12 of Table 11 and 1,2,3,5,8,9,10,11,12 of Table 12). Therefore, for
the purpose of this study, we will proceed with the analysis based on the FE and RE focusing
only on the specific determinants on post global financial crisis period (interaction model 4–12
of Tables 11 and 12).
It can be observed from Models 4–12 of Tables 11 and 12 that the coefficients of the interaction
variables (specific determinants on post global financial crisis) mostly remain the same. They
exhibit the same sign, the same order of magnitude, and remain significant as in the OLS regression
models (albeit sometimes at different levels). However, it can be observed from Table 11 the
coefficient of capitalization (LNETA*PTC) turn into significantly positive relationship with profit
efficiency for SCBs (Model 7) under FE estimation after controlling for heteroscedasticity. This
implies, the higher capitalization, contribute to the higher SCBs’ profit efficiency specifically on
post global financial crisis.
Finally, it should be noted that the coefficient of the size (LNTA*PTC) is remain significant
with the PCBs profit efficiency under FE estimation (Model 4 of Table 12) when we control
for potential heteroscedasticity. However, the result need be interpreted with caution since the
coefficient of the variable is significant only at 10% level. Meanwhile, when this study control for
heteroscedasticity, the coefficient of inflation on post global financial crisis (LNINFL*PTC) turn
into insignificant exhibited in Model 11 of Table 12. Thus, this explain that the factor of inflation
is not significantly influence the profit efficiency of PCBs on post global financial crisis.
Conclusions
To date, studies on bank efficiency are numerous. However, most of these studies have con-
centrated on the banking sectors of the western and developed countries. Therefore, this study
investigate for the first time empirical evidence on impact of global financial crisis focusing on
SCBs and PCBs ownership and others bank specific and macroeconomics factors influencing
profit efficiency level of the Bangladesh banking sector. By using data on Bangladesh banks dur-
ing the years 2004–2011 the present study fills in this demanding gap by providing new empirical
evidence. The present study consists of two stages. In the first stage, this study employ the Slack-
Based Data Envelopment Analysis (SBM-DEA) method to measure the level of profit efficiency
on SCBs and PCBs over the period of pre, during and post global financial crisis. In the second
stage, this study adopt a multivariate panel regression analysis framework based on the Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) and Generalized Least Square (GLS) methods comprising the Fixed Effect
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(FE) and Random Effect (RE) models to examine the potential determinants of banks’ profit
efficiency.
The empirical findings from the first stage indicate that the levels of profit efficiency on both
SCBs and PCBs are increasing by 3.7% (95.1% to 98.8%) on SCBs and increasing by 5.8%
(71.9% to 77.7%) on PCBs during financial crisis years (2007–2008). However, over the period
of post financial crisis years (2009–2011) exhibited that, profit efficiency levels on SCBs and
PCBs are decreasing by 38.7% (98.8% to 60.1%) on SCBs and decreasing by 9.9% (77.7% to
67.8%) on PCBs.
Although profit efficiency levels on both ownership of banks shows declining over the post
financial crisis years, the PCBs still higher than SCBs (67.8% > 60.1%) but insignificantly differ-
ent. Accordingly, this results could suggest that to avoid the declining of the profit efficiency levels
over the period of post financial crisis, banks should identify the potential external and internal
determinants that can significantly influence to the improvement of SCBs and PCBs efficiency.
Furthermore, the results from the multivariate panel regression analysis discovered the poten-
tial bank specific and macroeconomics determinants that significantly influence the improvement
of profit efficiency levels on both SCBs and PCBs specifically on post global financial cri-
sis period. A closer examination on the findings reveals that the relationship of size of bank
(LNTA*PTC), liquidity (LNLOANSTA*PTC), economic growth (LNGDP*PTC) and market
concentration (LNCR3*PTC) are significantly negative with profit efficiency of SCBs but have a
positive impact in the case of the PCBs ownership.
This result implies that over the period of post global financial crisis, the large size of banks,
higher liquidity, well economic growth and higher market concentration tend to lead to lower
level of SCBs’ profit efficiency. This indicate that the SCBs operated at diseconomies of scale,
borrowers are likely to default on their loans, the volatile of economic growth and reducing the
credit demand from the firms. Therefore, the results suggest that to improve or increase the level
of SCBs’ profit efficiency, banks should shrink the banks’ size, reduce the liquidity, await for
the stable economic growth and squeeze the market concentration since those determinants have
negative relationship with efficiency.
Meanwhile, the contra finding for the PCBs indicate that over the global financial crisis period
banks may benefit from economies of scale, banks used huge liquidity to fund large loans, reducing
on the default loan and the PCBs earn the monopoly profits. Thus, based on the findings reveal,
the PCBs should promote growth for size of banks, enhance the liquidity, offer more loans and
increase the market concentration in order to obtain higher level of profit efficiency since these
variables have a positive relationship with the banks’ profit efficiency specifically over the global
financial crisis period.
Furthermore, the variables of credit risk (LNLLRGL*PTC) and inflation (LNINFL*PTC) are
significant with the negative sign but the capitalization (LNETA*PTC) is significantly positive
with the profit efficiency of the SCBs specifically on post global financial crisis period. This results
indicate that the over the period of post crisis, SCBs with a higher credit risk (LNLLRGL*PTC)
will have lower bank efficiency. A higher credit risk means that banks may deal with a higher
possibility that its loans will become non-performing. Thus, the higher credit risk indicates the
higher possibility of the banks to be confronted with unpaid loans and increasing of the non-
performing loans, which both, imply lower asset quality. Furthermore, the negative coefficient
of LNINFL*PTC indicate that the borrowers will react negatively to the increase in inflation as
they believe the rate of inflation may be reduced in the future. Finally, the positive coefficient of
capitalization signifies the well-capitalized banks would increase banks’ revenue and profitability
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due to the lower expected costs of financial distress, lower expected bankruptcy costs, and lower
risk of portfolio.
The empirical findings from this study clearly call for regulators and decision makers to review
the profit efficiency of banks operating in the Bangladesh banking sector. This consideration is
vital because profit efficiency is the most important concept which could lead to higher or lower
profitability of the Bangladesh banking sector. The results could also provide better information
and guidance to bank managers, as they need to have clear understanding on the impact of profit
efficiency on the performance of their banks. The findings may also have implications for investors
whose main goal is to reap higher profit from their investments. By doing so, they could concentrate
on the potential profitability of banks before investing.
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